The U.S. Navy's Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida

A Critical Assessment

Office of Senator Jim Webb
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Executive Summary

The Navy has made no compelling argument to justify its proposal to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport. There is little or no evidence that the Navy's preferred homeporting alternative is supported by either strategic necessity or economic logic. Given the unavoidable adverse impact that today's economic crisis will have on defense programs, the Navy would be irresponsible to incur costs (already projected to exceed $600 million) for a poorly justified project to duplicate existing nuclear-support facilities that the service itself describes as an "insurance policy."

The Navy's flawed and incomplete analysis does not demonstrate a strategic necessity or the economic logic for homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport. Of note:

- **There is no indication the Navy conducted a formal, comparative threat/survivability intelligence assessment to validate its claim that dispersing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Mayport will reduce risk or increase operational readiness.** The Navy has provided no documentation of a cohesive, focused assessment of current and projected military threats for its homeporting proposal that included estimated levels of risk, potential vulnerabilities, and the implications for survivability, consequence management, and physical security programs;

- **The Coast Guard currently assesses the port-security risk for the Hampton Roads region and the port of Jacksonville/Mayport to be the same.** The Navy did not request the U.S. Coast Guard to provide an independent assessment of maritime security risk in Hampton Roads, Virginia., or Mayport, Florida. The U.S. Coast Guard has statutory responsibilities for assessing maritime security risk in major U.S. seaports.

- **The concept of strategic dispersal was challenged by critics even at the height of the Cold War.** In 1986, for example, the GAO reported that the Navy's decision to disperse the fleet as part of its strategic homeporting plan was not based on a formal threat analysis, deeming the conventional threat to U.S. ports as relatively low.

- **The Navy fails to acknowledge the more than $111-million investment federal agencies have made to improve port security in Hampton Roads to mitigate significantly the risk of a terrorist attack.**

- **The Navy's proposal is fiscally irresponsible. The Navy estimated that it had $4.6 billion in unfunded budget priorities for fiscal year 2009.** The Navy does not account for the impact the project's approximately $600 million to $1 billion cost would have on the Navy's inadequately funded accounts for shipbuilding and aircraft procurement, shore readiness, and military construction. The proposal also runs counter to the Navy's "Shore Investment Strategy" which calls for consolidating the Navy's shore footprint to save money and improve physical security.

- **The Navy did not acknowledge that aircraft carriers homeported in Norfolk are supported by multiple military and civilian airfields, including an outlying airfield necessary to support carrier-qualification training requirements for the Atlantic Fleet carrier air wings.** In 2006, the citizens of Jacksonville had the chance to reopen the Naval Air Station Cecil Field for military use, but they voted not to do so.

- **The Navy issued its Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for homeporting alternatives in Mayport prior to the receipt of other agencies' statutory biological assessments.** The Navy also sought to fast-track the environmental review process so that it could issue its Record of Decision in early January. Virginia Governor Timothy M. Kaine described the Navy's FEIS as "legally insufficient and technically flawed."

- **Naval Station Norfolk is home to one of the largest regional concentrations of naval and military installations in the world, but the Navy did not apparently assess the impact that relocating a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Naval Station Mayport would have on assigned crew members and their families.** Any assessment of the impact of a permanent change of station should include all relevant training, career progression, sea-shore rotation, permanent change of station, and quality-of-life factors.

- **There is no evidence the Navy evaluated the comparative advantages for the private sector's ship-repair industrial base in Jacksonville resulting from an alternative homeporting arrangement encompassing a larger number of surface-combatant warships.**

It is my strong belief that no funds should be made available for the relocation of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Naval Station Mayport unless the Navy fully justifies such a move in a comprehensive report to the appropriate congressional defense committees.

I. Background and Purpose

This paper critically assesses the strategic rationale, financial considerations, environmental dimensions, and personnel impacts associated with the Navy's proposal to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station (NAVSTA) Mayport, Florida. On November 21, 2008, after completing a two-year Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and assessing 13 alternatives, the Navy announced its preferred alternative to homeport a single nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at NAVSTA Mayport in Florida.

The Navy's stated purpose for this proposed action is to ensure effective support of fleet operational requirements through efficient use of waterfront and shore side facilities at NAVSTA Mayport. In 2010 the Navy will begin to decommission frigates currently homeported at Mayport. While budgetary decisions drive a Navy trend to consolidate or reduce the number of Navy bases overall, the Service maintains that retaining bases in dispersed locations nationwide and around the world supports its Fleet Response Plan and its operational battle forces. The EIS states, "The Navy needs to utilize the available facilities at NAVSTA Mayport, both pierside and shoreside, in an effective and efficient manner, *thereby minimizing new construction*."[1]

Contrary to the Navy's professed goal to identify a homeporting alternative that would minimize new Navy military construction, *permanently assigning a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Mayport is one of the most expensive alternatives that the Navy evaluated*. (Three more expensive options included variants of homeporting cruisers, destroyers, an amphibious assault ship (LHA), and a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.) Homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport will require extensive dredging, infrastructure and wharf improvements, and construction of expensive nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities needed for the performance of depot-level maintenance.

The Navy estimates the additional costs associated with its preferred CVN hompeporting option is a one-time expenditure of $564.8 million, of which $426 million would be in new military construction. An additional recurring cost of $20.4 million also is projected. The EIS states estimated construction impacts of $671 million; according to the Navy, this sum reflects the estimated economic benefit to the region resulting from the federal investment of military construction dollars (i.e., the "ripple effect"), not just the budgeted construction costs.

The Navy maintains that homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at NAVSTA Mayport would reduce risks to fleet resources in the event of a natural disaster, man-made calamity, or attack by foreign nations or terrorists. This rationale includes purported risks to aircraft carriers, industrial support facilities, and the people that operate and maintain these crucial assets. The net result, according to the Navy, is increased operational readiness.

As Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter explained, "The principal rationale for that has

to do with the vulnerability of the concentration [of aircraft carriers] we have right now in the Tidewater [Va.] area and the desirability to be able to have an additional resource for homeport operations and support."[2]

Given the significant budgetary impact of the Navy's preferred alternative, it is reasonable to ask if the Navy's proposal: (1) is based on a formal threat/survivability analysis; and (2) will produce benefits that are worth the additional costs given the Navy's unfunded budget requirements and the extraordinary financial crisis facing our nation today.

II. Strategic Rationale for Fleet Dispersal: A Flawed and Incomplete Analysis

Conventionally, non-nuclear powered aircraft carriers were homeported at NAVSTA Mayport until the decommissioning of the USS John F Kennedy (CV 67) in 2007. At present, all five of the Navy's aircraft carriers homeported on the East Coast are assigned to NAVSTA Norfolk, Va., the Navy's only East Coast facility capable of supporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Navy's six nuclear-powered aircraft carriers homeported in the Pacific region are geographically dispersed on the West Coast (5 CVNs when the USS Carl Vinson completes its refueling overhaul in 2010) and forward deployed to Japan (1 CVN).[3]

The Navy's selection of the CVN East Coast homeporting alternative as its preferred option for Mayport was influenced by several factors, but the Navy cited *fleet strategic dispersal* considerations as a primary reason. In the Navy's view, homeporting an aircraft carrier at Mayport would enhance the distribution of homeport locations and reduce risks to fleet resources in the event of natural disaster, man-made calamity, or attack by foreign nations or terrorists.[4]
A copy of the executive summary to the Navy's Final EIS is provided at Appendix 1.

A Navy briefing on the Mayport Homeporting EIS to members of Congress on November 18, 2009, elaborated on the strategic rationale behind the Navy's proposal.[5] The Navy's "strategic laydown" methodology for apportioning the planned 313-ship fleet to the West Coast, East Coast, and forward-deployed homeports for the year 2020 was influenced by the following:

- Navy Force Structure Analysis: Based on conventional campaigns, the Global War on Terror, and homeland defense requirements;
- 2020 Global Maritime Posture: Satisfy integrated steady-state and lesser-contingency requirements;
- Navy 313-Ship Plan: Encompass total force structure—the process baseline for the Navy's strategic laydown; and
- Additional Factors: Optimize sourcing of forces based on speed of response (time/distance), Maritime Strategy, and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The Navy's strategic laydown analysis for the year 2020 yielded a total of 132 ships based on the East Coast, including a total of five nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. A

chart in the Navy's congressional briefing on its EIS depicted the relative advantages of homeporting a CVN in Norfolk or Mayport resulting from the Navy's operational comparison in five categories:

	Response times to COCOMs	Transit times to Respective Training Ranges	Hurricane Risk	Man Made Disaster Risk	Physical Force Protection
Norfolk	**Slight** Advantage		**No** Advantage		
Mayport	**Slight SOUTHCOM** Advantage (HADR/GFS)	**Slight** Advantage	**No** Advantage	**Slight** Advantage	**Slight** Advantage

The Navy's November 18 briefing stated the following conclusions regarding its comparison of Norfolk vs. Mayport:

- Average Response (Transit) Times to Combatant Commanders: "Transit time differences *strategically insignificant*."
- Relative Hurricane Risk: "Historically—hurricane risk to Norfolk is *similar* to Jacksonville."
- Risk Assessment: "Mayport would provide a strategic option and serve as a hedge against risk to Hampton Roads."

In assessing military risk at either NAVSTA Norfolk or NAVSTA Mayport, the Navy identified the following implications resulting from an act of aggression involving either a nation state (a traditional conventional or nuclear attack) or an act of terrorism:

- Loss of one or more nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
- Unable to sortie nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, guided-missile destroyers, or guided-missile cruisers due to a blocked channel;
- Unable to bring carriers at sea pierside on the East Coast due to blocked channel.

The Navy's comparative assessment of each homeport concluded, "The most compelling strategic rationale to homeport a CVN/LHA in Mayport is as a hedge against a catastrophic event in Norfolk." Pressed during the November 18 congressional briefing to identify a precise threat warranting this conclusion, one of the officers stated Mayport had a "slight advantage," but there was not a clear, credible threat distinguishing one homeport from the other. Copies of the Navy's Briefing Slides are provided at Appendix 2.

In summary, according to the Navy's own assessment, *the meager advantages attributed to NAVSTA Mayport over NAVSTA Norfolk were acknowledged by Navy briefers to be "slight" at best*, while initial Navy estimates identify nearly $600 million in military

construction costs and other expenses that would be incurred to enable Mayport to serve as a homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. These cost projections could well run much higher. *The Navy's flawed and incomplete analysis does not demonstrate a strategic necessity for homeporting a CVN in Mayport.*

- Issue 1: *There is no indication the Navy conducted a formal intelligence-based threat/survivability analysis that specifically addressed force dispersal. Absent a more rigorous and documented threat/survivability assessment, it is impossible to validate the Navy's alleged claim that dispersing a single CVN to Mayport will reduce risk and increase operational readiness.*

  There is an emotional appeal to the concept of reducing security risk through fleet dispersal. In today's budget-constrained environment, however, a formal threat analysis is essential to allow the Department of Defense and Congress to make informed decisions regarding the relative level of military risk (low, medium, high) and if the security benefits that will be supposedly be achieved through a proposed course of action are worth the costs. A classified version of the Navy's November 18 briefing did not address this issue. Subsequently, then-Senator John Warner and Senator Jim Webb asked the Navy to provide the classified "threat assessment" for NAVSTA Norfolk and NAVSTA Mayport that guided the Navy's selection of its preferred homeporting alternative.

  The Navy's classified briefing took place December 8, 2008. Unclassified highlights of the briefing are summarized as follows:

  - It was less a formal, integrated comparative threat assessment reflecting current intelligence estimates, threats, consequences, vulnerabilities, and mitigating factors than it was a "file-drawer" compilation of past classified security assessments prepared largely by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) for installations in the region (Naval Air Station Oceana, Craney Island, Northrop Grumman Newport News) that were said to be applicable to southern Virginia in general. Similar past NCIS security assessments for installations in the Jacksonville/Mayport region also were provided for comparison.

  - There was no stand-alone security assessment for NAVSTA Norfolk included in the briefing—potential security risks identified for other installations were extrapolated to the Hampton Roads region.

  - There was no indication during the December 8 briefing that the Office of Naval Intelligence conducted an independent threat/survivability study to guide the Navy's homeporting proposal. The National Maritime Intelligence Center, staffed jointly by the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps, provides a world-class maritime intelligence capability dedicated to the nation's defense. It is superbly qualified to conduct a more rigorous threat assessment.

- After a discussion of approximately 15 to 20 minutes, then-Senator Warner told the Navy's briefing officers, "If you have the law, argue the law. If you have the facts, argue the facts. You don't have the facts." Pressed to make a clearer threat-based distinction between Norfolk and Mayport, the Navy's senior briefing officer acknowledged, "*The risk of a catastrophic event in Hampton Roads is small, but the CNO [chief of naval operations] wants an insurance policy in the event one occurs*."

- By this, the officer explained that having nuclear-capable repair facilities in Mayport for a CVN would be a "strategic hedge" in the event of a catastrophic event in Hampton Roads. He cited the need for an alternate East Coast Controlled Industrial Facility capable of supporting a CVN. "It's not about Norfolk versus Mayport," the flag officer said, "It's about having all assets in one place."

- The Navy's senior briefing officer would not agree that the Navy's rationale for CVN strategic dispersal on the East Coast represents a "worst case, least likely" scenario in terms of military risk. Then-Senator Warner, however, emphasized that the future terrorist threats are far more likely to center on Washington, D.C., than Norfolk. "We're more vulnerable here," Senator Warner said. "You have more security in Norfolk." The Navy briefing officers did not disagree.

- Issue 2: *There is no question that the risk of a terrorist attack somewhere in the world involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) will increase in the future. What the Navy has failed to assess for military installations like NAVSTA Norfolk or NAVSTA Mayport are: (1) the threat level now and implications for the future; (2) potential vulnerabilities; and (3) implications for survivability, consequence management, and physical security programs.*

  - The U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism reported in December 2008, "The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."[6]

  - The Commission believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. It called for the U.S. government to take more aggressive action to limit proliferation of such weapons to reduce the likelihood of a bio-terror attack.

  - From a military-threat perspective, however, it is necessary to assess the likelihood that a terrorist WMD would be directed against a U.S. military installation vs. a more vulnerable civilian target. The unclassified version of the *National Intelligence Estimate* released in 2007 states: "We assess that al-Qa'ida's homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on

prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the U.S. population."

- Issue 3: *The Navy did not request the U.S. Coast Guard to provide an independent assessment of maritime security risk in Hampton Roads, Va., or Mayport, Fla.*[7]

  - The U.S. Coast Guard has statutory responsibilities for assessing maritime security risk in major U.S. seaports. Its current assessment of maritime security risks in the Hampton Roads region and Jacksonville/Mayport, Fla., would allow for a more informed cost/benefit analysis of the Navy's homeporting proposal. The Coast Guard confirmed the Navy made no request for its assessment.

  - The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 33 CFR 103.400, required the Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committees to ensure risk-based AMS Assessments are completed and meet the requirements of 33 CFR 103.310 and 103.405, which include identifying risks through threat, consequence, and vulnerability. The AMS Committee is established under the direction of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port per 33 CFR 103.300.

  - The SAFE Port Act of 2006, Section 111, required the Department of Homeland Security to provide a risk assessment tool with standardized risk criteria to AMS Committees. The Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model developed by the Coast Guard is an accepted risk assessment tool with standardized risk criteria.

- Issue 4: *The Coast Guard currently assesses the port security risk for the Hampton Roads region and the Jacksonville/Mayport, Fla. area to be the same.*

  - The Coast Guard supports the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the administration of the DHS Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The PSGP prioritizes security risk and allocates grant funds to port areas, which are rank-ordered in four groups.

  - Group One represents the highest risk ports and Group Four the lowest. The Hampton Roads region is a Group Two port, which generally equates with medium risk. The Coast Guard confirmed in December 2008 that Jacksonville/Mayport also is ranked as a Group Two port.

- Issue 5: *The Navy's military-risk assessment for NAVSTA Norfolk ignores how U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security investments in port security and Navy physical security enhancements since 9/11 have significantly mitigated risk in Hampton Roads. Since September 11, 2008, these agencies have invested more than $111 million in the Hampton Roads region to strengthen port security and reduce the risk of a successful terrorist attack.*

- U.S. Coast Guard: The U.S. Coast Guard has invested millions of dollars in improving port security in Hampton Roads since 9/11—to include the stand-up of a Joint Harbor Operations Center (manned jointly by the Coast Guard and the Navy). A summary of Coast Guard investments is provided at Appendix 3.

    - The Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC) in Hampton Roads is a combined Coast Guard/Navy watch floor. The JHOC, also called a Sector Command Center - Joint (SCC-J), is involved with all 11 Coast Guard mission areas with the addition of an Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection cell staffed by the Navy. The SCC-J is enhanced with the communication systems necessary to coordinate and conduct military High Value Unit escorts. Hampton Roads is also enhanced with radars and cameras to monitor escorts and security zones around critical infrastructure.

    - These capabilities, combined with special navigation regulations in the area, enhance awareness of all port activities and improve security in the lower Chesapeake Bay. This situational awareness and interagency cooperation increases the opportunity to detect and respond to threats in the maritime environment.[8]

  Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Between 2002 and 2008, the DHS Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) also provided $30.4 million to the Hampton Roads port region. In the early years of the PSGP, the grant applications were focused largely on enhancing physical security and surveillance (e.g., gates, fences, cameras, etc.) at individual facilities. In recent years, the grant applications have become much more inclusive and robust:

    - Group I and II Ports have been developing Port Wide Risk Management plans and are in the process of implementing five-year investment plans to "buy down" the risk.

    - Examples of the types of allocations of PSGP funding for the Hampton Roads region between 2002 and 2008 include such enhancements as a grant of $846,000 in 2007 to local police departments for maritime domain awareness equipment and security patrol boats. Also in 2007, the Virginia Department of Emergence Management received $1.8 million to develop Port Area Wide Risk Management/Mitigation and Business Continuity Plans.

- U.S. Navy: The U.S. Navy has made significant investments since 9/11 to improve physical security at NAVSTA Norfolk and other installations in the Hampton Roads region. These port security improvements reduce

military risk and potential vulnerabilities. For example, a Waterfront Security Operations Center was established at NAVSTA Norfolk to integrate, coordinate, and control the security initiatives and response of all waterfront naval assets. Installations also are in the process of receiving the Electronic Harbor Security System—a combination of surface and subsurface threat detection and response capabilities at an approximate cost of $700,000. A host of other initiatives have been achieved at area installations, including the provision of Harbor Security Boat assets to patrol the waterfront and serve as a first response layer for waterfront threats. Physical security improvements also have been made.[9] A summary of Navy port security improvements, provided in response to a request for information, is provided at Appendix 4.

- Acting in cooperation with the Coast Guard, the Navy has instituted procedures to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack to so-called "High Value Units." All high-value ships are provided an armed escort by either the Coast Guard or the Navy during their transit to or from NAVSTA Norfolk and other installations in the Hampton Roads area.

- According to the Navy, the escort by armed surface craft provides a highly visible security force to detect, deter and respond to a terrorist attack thus enhancing the overall port security in Hampton Roads. The Navy also provides armed escorts of submarines when Coast Guard assets are not available from the Naval Submarine Support Center located at NAVSTA Norfolk.

- The Navy also acknowledges the role that the Coast Guard's prototype Port and Coastal Surveillance System's wide network of sensors play in improving port security. The system, which includes radars, visual cameras, infrared cameras and other sensors, provides Coast Guard Sector Hampton Roads the ability to monitor overall port activity and provides targeted surveillance at critical junctures and key infrastructure across the port.

- The Navy stated the Coast Guard-Navy Joint Harbor Operations Center's advanced systems, staffing and interagency capabilities not only provide real-time situational, maritime domain awareness throughout the port, but also allow for the integration of public and private maritime risk mitigation strategies, ultimately enhancing port safety and security and mission effectiveness, efficiency and execution.

- Issue 6: *The Navy's current argument for CVN dispersal on the East Coast evokes a similar scheme used during the 1980s when then-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman developed a "Strategic Homeporting Plan" for a 600-ship Navy. Although the Navy contended that the dispersal of ships to more U.S. homeports*

would improve U.S. defense posture and the survivability of the fleet, this strategic underpinning was challenged by the General Accounting Office (GAO, today's Government Accountability Office). Regardless, the Navy's Strategic Homeporting Plan did not propose duplicating Norfolk's nuclear-repair capabilities for a CVN in Mayport.

- The Navy's "Strategic Homeporting" plan reflected concerns in the 1980s that the existing homeporting structure was not optimum from a strategic and military standpoint for a planned 600-ship Navy. The Navy based its plan on five principles: (1) *force dispersal*; (2) battlegroup integrity; (3) industrial base utilization; (4) geographic considerations; and (5) logistics suitability.

- In 1986, the GAO reported that the Navy's decision to disperse the fleet was not based on a formal threat/survivability analysis. "Some Navy officials advised us that the conventional threat to U.S. ports is relatively low," said one GAO official.[10]

    - The GAO later reported (GAO-NSIAD-86-146) that the Navy overstated the strategic imperative for dispersal. It found that the Naval Intelligence Command and a National Intelligence Estimate did not provide evidence of a demonstrable Soviet threat against U.S. homeports to justify the scale of investment. The Navy's military construction estimates for the plan totaled $799 million. This funding, a figure widely judged to be significantly underestimated at the time, was capped by Congress.

    - In 1990, the Congressional Research Service observed, " … It can be argued that the justification of avoiding a Pearl Harbor-like attack is now weaker than it was in the mid-1980s because the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union and its allies is now considered remote."[11]

    - By the end of 1991, any potential threat from the Soviet Union to justify strategic dispersal of the fleet evaporated with that country's dissolution and the end of the Cold War. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's goal of a 600-ship Navy fell victim to defense budget cuts five years before.
- More often than not, Norfolk's homeported aircraft carriers are geographically dispersed at sea through frequent operational deployments and work-ups. According to information provided by the Navy, the Naval Station's four carriers were in port simultaneously only 43 days in Fiscal Year 2008. In Fiscal Year 2007, that number was 18 days.

- The questions GAO raised more than 20 years ago regarding the strategic rationale for dispersing the fleet to multiple homeports are equally relevant today for assessing the Navy's CVN homeporting proposal for Mayport.

- The Navy has yet to provide a compelling strategic rationale for its East Coast CVN homeporting proposal that is supported with a focused threat/survivability analysis. The strategic dispersal concept may possibly have been a viable concept during the Cold War, but times have changed since the fall of the Soviet Union. The strategic dispersal argument is not applicable today if the military risk that would warrant dispersal is not judged to be high.

- Issue 7: *The Navy's narrowly focused proposal to relocate a CVN to Mayport does not reflect the same analytical framework used to evaluate similar homeporting proposals for the West Coast. Its comparative evaluation with Mayport ignored such critical factors as access to shoreside fleet training centers, cross-training and shore-duty reassignment opportunities for sailors, centralized logistics support, and other important advantages associated with NAVSTA Norfolk.*

    - When the Navy began planning in the 1990s to homeport up to three Nimitz-class CVNs on the West Coast, it advocated the homeport of North Island Naval Air Station owing to the existence of San Diego as an adjacent "megaport," maintenance advantages, and quality of life considerations. In addition, the Navy said that North Island (Coronado/San Diego) is a proven homeport for Pacific Fleet carriers, has an operational airfield that can support air wing logistics and aircraft, and contains an extensive and efficient transportation network.[12]

    - The Navy applied a similar analytical framework in 2007 when it reviewed four prospective homeports in the Pacific region for the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). In March 2007, the Navy announced the carrier would likely relocate to San Diego in early 2010 following the completion of its complex refueling overhaul now underway at the Northrop Grumman Newport News shipyard in Virginia. According to Hawaii's U.S. Senators Daniel Inouye and Daniel Akaka, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter's selection of San Diego was based on a consideration of such factors as each homeport's strategic location, the cost of infrastructure upgrades required to accommodate a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the port's proximity to an airfield, and training opportunities for the carrier's aircrew.[13]

- Issue 8: *Aircraft carriers homeported in Norfolk are collocated with their operational aircraft squadrons, associated staffs, and assigned battle group ships. They are supported by multiple military and civilian airfields, including an outlying airfield necessary to support carrier-qualification training requirements for the Atlantic Fleet carrier air wings.*

    - Naval Air Station Cecil Field was the largest military installation in the Jacksonville, Florida., region when it was closed in 1999 following the recommendations of two Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC)

Commissions. In 2006, the citizens of Jacksonville were afforded an opportunity to reopen the airfield for military use as the result of BRAC 2005, but they voted not to do so.

- By contrast, the Commonwealth of Virginia and local communities in the Hampton Roads region have consistently supported operations at Naval Air Station Oceana—the Navy's East Coast Master Jet Base. In recent years, for example, the Commonwealth and municipalities in Virginia Beach have spent approximately $45 million to purchase land to reduce civilian encroachment at the airfield.

- Issue 9: *Despite the potential for increased military risk, in 2005 the Navy recommended the closure of Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut. (as part of Department of Defense BRAC actions) and relocation of its assigned submarines to NAVSTA Norfolk and Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia. This proposal was consistent with its Shore Investment Strategy.*

  - The Navy's primary justification for closing its submarine base in New London was the material contribution it would make to the maximum reduction of excess capacity (i.e., berthing capacity) while increasing the military value of the remaining bases affected by the proposal.[14]

  - One of the main elements in the Navy's Shore Investment Strategy is to reduce cost and improve physical security by eliminating any excesses in the Navy's shore footprint. "While fiscal imperatives across the Navy currently prevent full funding of shore-readiness requirements in the near term, we are making smart investments to support the fleet, fighter, and families," the Navy has stated.

  - By contrast, building duplicative nuclear-support shore infrastructure in Mayport runs counter to the objectives of the Navy's Shore Investment Strategy and will, in the long term, only continue to degrade the Navy's ability to provide full funding for other higher priority shore-readiness requirements.

III. Economic Factors: Mayport Proposal Enters the Realm of Fiscal Irresponsibility

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported in January 2009 that the United States has entered a recession that will probably be the longest and the deepest since World War II. As a share of the economy, the CBO estimates the deficit in 2009 also will be the largest recorded since World War II—$1.2 trillion, or 8.3 percent of the nation's gross domestic product. Federal revenues are expected to decline by $166 billion, or 6.6 percent, from 2008.[15] *The Washington Post* reported that Senator Kent Conrad, the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, called the figure "jaw-dropping."

The CBO also reported in early January that carrying out defense spending plans of the Bush administration's Fiscal Year 2009 Future Years Defense Program would require sustaining annual defense spending over the long term at higher real (inflation-adjusted) levels than those that occurred at the peak of the defense build-up in the mid-1980s.[16]

In a speech on the economy and a proposed federal government economic recovery plan, President-elect Obama said, ""If nothing is done, this recession could linger for years. The unemployment rate could reach double digits. Our economy could fall $1 trillion short of its full capacity, which translates into more than $12,000 in lost income for a family of four."[17] The President-elect also vowed in a press conference January 7, 2009, to ensure that federal government dollars are not wasted, tasking his nominee as "chief performance officer" in the White House budget office to retool budget practices and cut unnecessary programs. "In order to make these investments that we need, we'll have to cut the spending that we don't," he said.[18]

Given this extraordinary financial crisis, the need to reduce non-critical federal spending, and the compelling requirement to fund higher-priority Navy budget requirements, the Navy's homeporting proposal for Mayport is fiscally irresponsible. *Last year, the Navy identified $4.6 billion in Fiscal Year 2009 unfunded budget requirements.* Its unfunded budget requirements for Fiscal Year 2010 will be made known to Congress when the new administration's defense budget request is proposed. Homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport at a cost that could approach $1 billion is a luxury the Navy simply cannot afford.

- Issue 1: *The Navy is substantially under-investing in its shipbuilding and aircraft procurement accounts. Expensive investments in duplicative nuclear-support infrastructure in Mayport are opportunity costs the Navy cannot afford in the face of the compelling requirement to reset, modernize, and recapitalize its ships and aircraft.*

    - Attaining the goal of a 313-ship Navy is already in doubt owing to a combination of factors, including an underfunded Navy shipbuilding plan, unrealistic cost estimates, a steady growth in the cost of shipbuilding programs, and mission-requirements creep.

    - The Navy's long-range shipbuilding plan for 313 ships should be considered a floor—the minimum number of ships necessary for the Navy and Marine Corps team to meet its global commitments. Recapitalizing today's deployable battle force of 283 ships is encountering new affordability problems.

    - For example, the costs of the commodities needed to build ships skyrocketed between 2001 and 2007—including a 109 percent increase in the price for carbon steel, a 360 percent increase for copper, and a 535 percent increase for nickel. Such unprecedented cost increases are beyond the ability of the Navy to control, *Seapower* magazine reported recently. "No one has been able to model this," the deputy assistant secretary of the

Navy for Ship Programs (Research, Development, and Acquisition) said.[19]

- The Navy also faces a significant shortfall in the number of strike-fighter tactical aircraft needed for its 10 carrier air wings. The Navy's own estimate is that it will be more than 125 strike-fighters short by 2014 due to the retirement of F/A-18 Hornet aircraft before the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter is operational. A more responsible operational alternative for spending the estimated $600 million the Navy projects for homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport is to use this funding to address the Navy's strike-fighter shortfall.

    - The typical air wing aboard a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier includes four F/A-18 squadrons totaling roughly 44 aircraft. If the current tactical aircraft shortfall is not reversed, there is a real concern that a major portion of the Navy's aircraft carrier fleet will be rendered hollow.

    - Of the Navy's 10 carrier air wings, one—Carrier Air Wing 17, home-based at Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia—has only one of its required four squadrons of F/A-18 Hornets assigned owing to the Navy's current tactical aircraft shortfall. When CVW-17 deploys to sea on an aircraft carrier, it must "crossdeck" (i.e., borrow) F/A-18 aircraft from other squadrons on the East or West Coasts. Unavoidably, this cross decking of squadron aircraft, pilots, and support personnel poses adverse consequences to their operational and personnel tempo.

    - Should the Department of Defense approve multi-year contracting for the F/A-18 Hornet strike-fighter, approximately 12 modern aircraft could be procured for the $600 million the Navy plans to spend in Mayport—a sufficient number of aircraft for one additional squadron.

- Issue 2: *Good stewardship of taxpayer dollars demands that the Navy should fund its shortfalls in shore-readiness requirements rather than expand its footprint ashore with duplicative facilities. There is no economic logic to the Navy's proposal for Mayport.*

    - Before creating excess infrastructure and nuclear-warship capacity in Mayport, the Navy should complete a large number of critical unfunded, backlogged military construction and modernization projects.

    - Owing to the chronic underfunding of modernization at its four public naval shipyards, the Navy confirmed a $791 million backlog in sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects at its four naval shipyards during Fiscal Year 2008:

- Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard: $183 million
- Puget Sound Naval Shipyard: $208 million
- Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: $176 million
- Norfolk Naval Shipyard: $224 million

- Within the last several years, NAVSTA Norfolk has undergone approximately $400 million in facility upgrades to allow it to better support nuclear powered aircraft carriers. This investment included a $155 million project to demolish and rebuild Pier 11 for the station's assigned aircraft carriers. Before duplicating Norfolk's existing capital-intensive facilities in Mayport, the Navy should make the fiscally sound decision to optimize past investments at Norfolk and preserve scarce resources to address the near crisis in budget shortfalls for its people, shipbuilding program, aircraft procurement, and installations.

- As noted previously, the Navy's proposal for Mayport also runs counter to its current Shore Investment Strategy, which calls for consolidating the Navy's shore footprint to save money and improve physical security. New military instruction construction costs in Mayport can only be funded at the expense of existing military construction and modernization projects.

- Issue 3: *The Navy's need to retain NAVSTA Mayport as an operational base for surface ships is not questioned; at issue is the need for the Navy to adopt a more cost-effective, responsible alternative centered on such platforms as the littoral combat ship, guided-missile destroyers, guided-missile cruisers, or an amphibious assault ship. The projected benefits to the private sector's ship-repair industrial base in Jacksonville should be considered in this new assessment.*

  - Sustaining the nation's ship-repair industrial base is a continuing challenge given the sizable reduction in the size of the fleet over the past 20 years. The number of Navy ships on active service is at one of its lowest levels since World War I.
  - Unlike a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, homeporting additional numbers of surface combatant warships will generate a higher level of sustained ship-repair work for the private sector in Jacksonville—a material benefit to a critical strategic sector of the defense industrial base that also will added economic benefits to the local economy.

- Issue 4: *The Navy's cost estimates of more than half-a-billion dollars to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport should be independently verified for accuracy. The actual costs likely will run substantially higher if past is prologue.*

  - During congressional consideration of the Navy's military construction budget submission for fiscal year 1996, for example, the Navy was chastised by a member of the House of Representatives for the inaccuracy

of its estimated funding necessary to berth three aircraft carriers at Naval Air Station North Island. The Navy's initial estimate of $267.8 million was later revised upward to $546.1 million following a GAO review.[20]

IV. Environmental Assessment: "Legally Insufficient and Technically Flawed"

Senator Jim Webb and then-Senator John Warner expressed serious concerns with numerous aspects of the Navy's Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) in a December 2008 meeting with officials from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries Service. "The Navy's documented haste to issue a record of decision must not be allowed to interfere with your agencies' requirements to complete the Section 7 consultation process with due diligence," they said.

- Issue 1: *The Navy issued its FEIS prior to completion of the Biological Opinions, which is inconsistent with the Endangered Species Act Handbook. The Navy also sought to fast track the environmental review process so that it could issue its Record of Decision in early January 2009.*

  - At the time the FEIS is issued, "section 7" consultation should be completed. Absent these agencies' assessments, it is questionable if the Navy adequately assessed the impacts of its actions on protected species in the FEIS.

  - The Navy attempted to fast-track each agencies' comment period by requesting their inputs be submitted by December 31, 2008. Given the potential adverse impacts of the proposed homeporting action on several threatened and endangered species, Senator Webb and then-Senator Warner encouraged agency officials to take the time and obtain the documentation needed to conduct thorough analyses of the Navy's proposed action, unhindered by arbitrary deadlines.

    - The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) received the Navy's completed consultation package for a Mayport Opinion December 8, 2008. The Endangered Species Act allows the agency 135 days to complete its formal consultation—a deadline of April 22, 2009.

    - NMFS officials acknowledged they would be "challenged" to meet the Navy's arbitrary deadline of December 31 and subsequently set a working deadline of January 5, 2009, to complete their assessment.

- Issue 2: *The Navy's proposal to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport would increase the amount of military and commercial traffic in and around the Naval Station and require the collection and disposal of 5.2 million cubic yards of dredged material.*

- Owing to the greater draft of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, increased dredging will result in thousands of additional vessel trips to and from dredge disposal areas.

- The Navy's proposed action presents potential risks to species and habitat protected under the Endangered Species Act, particularly the North American right whale and the Florida manatee, and their respective habitats. Both species are particularly susceptible to ship-strikes, which could increase should the Navy homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport.

- Issue 3: *The Navy intends to make its East Coast CVN homeporting decision without the benefit of the conclusions from the East Coast Range Complex Biological Evaluation, which is not expected to be completed until April 2009. The Navy narrowly defined the scope for its homeporting EIS for Mayport in terms of dredging and construction— notwithstanding the clear linkage with resulting aircraft carrier operations should a CVN be permanently stationed there.*

  - As stated in its EIS, one of the Navy's three factors behind its consideration of NAVSTA Mayport as a homeport for additional ships is the use of the facility to help optimize fleet access to naval training ranges and operating areas by retaining ship homeport locations within six hours transit time of local operating areas.[21] Clearly, there is an inextricable linkage between the Navy's desire to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport with resulting training activities and other ship operations.

  - Unavoidably, such increased operational activity and ship transits pose potential risks to endangered species, including the right whale. Senator Webb and then-Senator John Warner encouraged the NMFS to complete a single, more comprehensive Biological Assessment that addresses the Navy's acknowledged CVN training and operational activities—and not be bound by the Navy's purposefully narrow approach in defining its EIS. The Endangered Species Act handbook provides the authority for NMFS to make its own determination about the proper scope of its assessment. It cannot be forced by the Navy to accept an overly narrow scope.

On December 19, 2008, Governor Timothy M. Kaine submitted the Commonwealth of Virginia's comments on the Navy's FEIS for proposed homeporting alternatives at Mayport. "The Final Environmental Impact Statement is legally insufficient and technically flawed," Governor Kaine said. A copy of the Commonwealth of Virginia's comments to the Navy, identifying 16 major concerns, is provided at Appendix 5. Courts have rejected federal agency EISs for the precise types of deficiencies found in the Navy's Mayport EIS.

Similar concerns were raised December 18, 2008, in a letter to the Navy signed by all members of the Public Sector Board of Directors for the Hampton Roads Military and Federal Facilities Alliance. The board is composed of the mayors of nine cities and the chairs of three county boards of supervisors representing the Hampton Roads region.

Congress has paid renewed attention to issues associated with strategic homeporting of Navy ships for the last four years. There are significant environmental issues associated with the Navy's proposal for Mayport, Florida. It is inconceivable that those agencies responsible for evaluating the environmental impacts of the Navy's proposal should not be afforded as much time as necessary to ensure their assessments and opinions are developed as thoroughly and carefully as possible.

V. Sailors and Their Families: Added Hardships

Military leaders are fond of saying, "Mission first—people always." That sentiment is hardly reflected in the Navy's proposal to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport owing to the added hardships the move will impose on Sailors and their families. The Navy's justification and rationale for its homeporting proposal pays only cursory attention to this critical consideration. Absent its crew, the aircraft carrier is nothing but cold, lifeless steel.

- Issue 1: *Should the Navy announce a decision to relocate a CVN to Mayport without naming the ship, Sailors and their families will face an uncertain future as they weigh the risks posed by a possible relocation.*

    - In today's precarious economy and fiscal crisis, the need to relocate one's family and find a new home is a far greater concern than even a year ago. Today's drastic fall-off in home sales and a persistent slump in the housing market are affecting military families. Faced with more frequent permanent-change-of-station moves than many of their civilian counterparts, the hardships can be more painfully acute. As noted by many financial experts, today's fiscal crisis and its economic impacts are not expected to be resolved quickly.

    - The town of Brandon, Fla., on Florida's western coast near MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, exemplifies the experiences many military families face today. One Air Force colonel purchased his four-bedroom home in 2005 for $333,000. With his tour ending three years later and orders in hand to move to the state of Washington, he could not find a buyer. He was one of an estimated 1,000 military members leaving MacDill during the summer of 2008, according to the *Tampa Bay Times*. An automated housing referral network serving military members in the Tampa Bay region listed 668 rental homes within a 60-mile radius of the Air Force base at the time. Those service members being reassigned who elected to rent their homes instead of selling found that the rent payments would not cover their mortgage payments.[22]

- The Congressional Budget Office reported in January 2009 that the inventory of unsold homes in the United States remains very high, despite the past year's reduction in housing starts and house prices. Military families, unavoidably, will continue to bear a disproportionate burden in this area owing to their more frequent, government-directed permanent-change-of-station reassignments.

- Issue 2: *NAVSTA Norfolk, home to one of the largest regional concentrations of naval and military installations in the world, offers far more quality-of-life and career progression opportunities to Sailors and their families than the far-smaller NAVSTA Mayport—including opportunities for shoreside training, medical care, family support, military commissaries and exchanges, and local employment.*

  - Ten years ago, the Navy began the realignment of its shore installations into fleet areas of concentration as part of a process known as "regionalization." Sea-going carrier Sailors—unlike Soldiers, Marines, or Airmen—must satisfy "sea-shore" rotation goals established by the Navy. An aviation boatswain's mate, for example, will likely spend four years assigned to sea duty followed by a three-year shore assignment.

  - Concentrating its aircraft carriers in Norfolk allows carrier sailors (and personnel assigned to nearby aviation squadrons) to have more stability and greater opportunity for suitable sea and shore assignments. The Norfolk area also boasts a large number of senior staff and joint-duty billets, a key factor in career progression for officers especially.

  - "Homebasing" is one initiative the Navy undertook in 1996 to assign enlisted Sailors to the same geographic area for their entire careers. The program benefits both the Sailors and families (more than 50 percent of today's enlisted members are married) and the Navy. The Sailor and family have less frequent reassignments out of their area of fleet concentration, contributing to greater stability in their personal lives. The Navy, in turn, reaps cost savings owing to the reduced requirement to pay for expensive permanent-change-of-station reassignments.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Navy has made no compelling argument to justify its proposal to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at NAVSTA Mayport. There is little or no evidence that the Navy's preferred homeporting alternative is supported by either economic logic or strategic necessity. Given the unavoidable adverse impact that today's economic crisis will have on federal programs, the Navy would be irresponsible to incur costs (already projected to exceed $600 million) for a poorly justified project that the service itself describes as an "insurance policy."

No funds from any defense appropriation should be made available for the relocation, or

planning for the relocation, of any nuclear-powered aircraft carrier away from NAVSTA Norfolk, or for any homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at NAVSTA Mayport unless the Navy fully justifies such a move in a comprehensive report to the congressional defense committees. This justification should include the following categories of information:

- A classified, comparative threat/survivability intelligence assessment of current and projected military threats for the homeporting of aircraft carriers at both NAVSTA Norfolk and NAVSTA Mayport, to include estimated levels of risk, potential vulnerabilities, and the implications for survivability, consequence management, and physical security programs. The U.S. Coast Guard should contribute to this threat assessment;

- An independent cost estimate prepared by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group of the Department of Defense of the total cost to be incurred by the United States to relocate an aircraft carrier from NAVSTA Norfolk to a new homeport, including the full costs of any associated support requirements, to include physical security, personnel, maintenance and construction of new facilities, and any additional costs that would be incurred by other state or federal agencies. The cost estimate should assess the degree to which it conforms to budget planning guidance issued by the new Obama administration;

- An evaluation of the economic impact in the Hampton Roads region resulting from the relocation of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from NAVSTA Norfolk to NAVSTA Mayport;

- A full accounting of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2010 unfunded budget requirements, to include shore readiness shortfalls identified in its *Shore Investment Strategy* and the current backlog in sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) projects at the Navy's four naval shipyards. The SRM backlog's impact on safety and industrial performance at each shipyard should be described as a part of this assessment;

- An assessment of the impact that relocating a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from NAVSTA Norfolk to NAVSTA Mayport would have on assigned crew members and their families, to include all relevant training, career progression, sea-shore rotation, and quality-of-life factors;

- An assessment of how the relocation of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from NAVSTA Norfolk to NAVSTA Mayport would affect the crew's access to shoreside fleet training centers, centralized logistics support, access to intermodal transportation systems, and the availability of supporting airfield(s);

- Identification of more cost-effective alternatives for homeporting surface ships at NAVSTA Mayport, to include an assessment of their impacts on the

private-sector ship-repair industrial base;

- An assessment of the optimum strategic laydown for Navy ships at NAVSTA Mayport that best satisfies operational military requirements identified by the Commander, U.S. Southern Command, in this command's area of operational responsibility;

- An assessment of the adequacy of the Navy's current inventory of public and private depot and intermediate maintenance facilities for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; and

- A certification from the Secretary of the Navy that the relocation of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is in the best interests of U.S. national security based on a strategic threat assessment.

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[1] Department of the Navy, Executive Summary, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at NAVSTA Mayport, FL, November 21, 2008, p. ES-2 (Subsequently cited as DON FEIS ES).

[2] Remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies *Statesmen's Forum*, Washington , D.C., November 17, 2008.

[3] The Navy will have 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in service when the George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) is commissioned Jan. 10, 2009. The Navy has announced that CVN 77 will be initially homeported in Norfolk. Other CVN homeports include: **Norfolk, Va.—**USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS Enterprise (CVN 65), USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69); **San Diego, Calif.**—USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Nimitz (CVN 68), and USS Carl Vinson* (CVN 70, following completion of a nuclear-refueling overhaul at Northrop Grumman Newport News, Va., the Navy has stated its preference for the ship to be homeported in San Diego in 2009); **Bremerton, Wash.**—USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74); **Everett, Wash.**—USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72); **Yokosuka, Japan**—USS George Washington (CVN 73).

[4] DON FEIS p. ES-16.

[5] A copy of the Department of the Navy's briefing is enclosed as Appendix 2.

[6] *World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism, (*New York: Vintage Books, 2008), p. xv.

[7] Information regarding the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibilities for maritime security and risk assessments was provided in writing by the Coast Guard in response to a formal request for information (RFI).

[8] U.S. Coast Guard response of December 19, 2008, to a formal request for information (RFI).

[9] U.S. Navy response of December 22, 2008, to a formal request for information (RFI).

[10] Statement by Bill W. Thurman, deputy director, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, February 26, 1986, p.2.

[11] "Strategic Homeporting Reconsidered," by Ronald O'Rourke, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, December 20, 1990.

[12] Letter from David R. Warren, director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, General Accounting Office, to Rep. Steven Horn, House of Representatives, April 21, 1995 (GAO/NSIAD-95-146R Nuclear Carrier Homeporting).

[13] "Navy Picks San Diego for Aircraft Carrier's New Homeport," by Jaymes Song, Associated Press, March 30, 2007.

[14] DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations (Vol IV), May 2005, p. A-7.
[15] "The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2009 to 2019," Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., January 2009, p.1.
[16] "Long-Term Implications of the Fiscal Year 2009 Future Years Defense Program," Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., January 2009, pp. 1-2.
[17] "Obama Warns of Dire Consequences Without Stimulus," by Michael D. Shear, The Washington Post, January 8, 2009, posted to on-line edition.
[18] "Congress Urges Spending Restraint," by Lori Montgomery, The Washington Post, January 8, 2009, p.2.
[19] "Costly Commodities: Coast Guard, Navy Shipbuilding Hit hard by Soaring Prices," by Patricia Kime, Seapower, November 2008, p. 18.
[20] *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, June 20, 1995, H6129.
[21] DON FEIS ES, p. ES-2.
[22] "Home Slump Pains Military," by Jan Wesner, *Tampa Bay Times*, April 27, 2008.

Appendix 1:
Department of the Navy, Executive Summary, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at NAVSTA Mayport, FL, November 21, 2008

Appendix 2:
Department of the Navy Briefing Slides, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at NAVSTA Mayport, FL

Appendix 3
U.S. Coast Guard budgetary investment in improved maritime security in the Hampton Roads region from FY 2002 through FY2008:

Fiscal Year	*Capability*	*Full Time Positions*	*Budgetary Investment*
FY02	Maritime Safety and Security Team Chesapeake	83	$6,397,000
FY03	Coast Guard Cutter SHEARWATER	11	$1,009,000
FY03	Facility Security Planners	4	$430,000
FY04	Joint Harbor Operations Center	25	$2,705,000
FY05	Port State Control Officers	8	$750,000

FY05	Marine Transportation Security Act Personnel	4	$463,000
FY05	Coast Guard Cutter SEAHORSE	16	$1,544,000
FY06	Establishment of Maritime Security Response Team	164	$13,971,000
FY07	Enhancement of Maritime Security Response Team	60	$5,007,000
FY07	Port Security Spot Inspector	1	$85,000
FY08	Port Security Spot Inspector	2	$208,000
FY08	Maritime Security Response Team Follow On		$859,000
FY02-08	Small Boat Station Personnel	20	$1,521,000
FY02-08	Small Boats (3 RB-s)		$840,000

Figures reflect fully annualized investments in then-year dollars.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard

Appendix 4:
U.S. Navy Investments in Port Security in the Hampton Roads Region

The following U.S. Navy port security improvements have been made in the Hampton Roads region since 9/11:

- Instituted a Waterfront Security Operations Center at NAVSTA Norfolk to integrate and coordinate/control the security initiatives and response of all waterfront naval assets. Installations are in process of receiving the Electronic Harbor Security System which is a combination of surface and subsurface threat detection and response capability. Approximate cost is $700,000.
- Installations are in process of receiving waterfront security barriers to more effectively cordon off the waterfront restricted areas of the installations. Approximate costs are

NAVSTA Norfolk Phase I $3,500,000, Phase II $2,277,000, Phase III $1,750,000, Phase IV $5,840,000, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard $3,020,000.

- Partial pier enclaving (i.e. fencing) instituted at installations homeporting High Value Units. Approximate cost is $250,000.
- Vehicle inspection station built near Pier 12 NAVSTA Norfolk. Approximate cost is $700,000.
- Installations have been provided with Harbor Security Boat (HSB) assets to patrol the waterfront and serve as a first response layer for waterfront threats. This initiative included the development of a complete training regimen to enable sailors to effectively employ HSB assets against threats. Approximate costs are Fiscal Year 2008 NAVSTA Norfolk maintenance $278,467, NAVSTA Norfolk HSB $4,540,000, Fiscal Year 2008 boat operations fuel $550,000.
- All waterfront piers instituted a "Chief of the Guard" program to coordinate security response to threats (landward and seaward). Approximate cost for NAVSTA Norfolk is $528,000.
- Piers undergoing renovation/construction are being provided with a seaward guard shelter at the end of each pier which serves an elevated guard position. Approximate costs are Guard Tower Pier 7 $400,000, Pier 3T $1,367,700, and Piers 1 and 4-14 Security Upgrade $1,632,100.
- Entry Control Points of installations (landward) are in the process of being renovated with security improvements in accordance with the Unified Facilities Criteria for Entry Control Facilities. This includes such security capabilities as final denial barriers, ballistic resistant guard shelters, elevated cover sentry positions, etc. Approximate costs are Gate 5 $4,483,282, Gate 2 and 3 $6,300,000, and Gate 22 $1,500,000.
- Security manning was approximately 600 personnel in 2001. This went up to nearly 1100 additional military personnel by 2003. It has dropped to just an addition 116 personnel in 2008. Approximate cost is $6,808,156 per year.

Source: U.S. Navy

Appendix 5:
Commonwealth of Virginia Comments on the Navy's Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at NAVSTA Mayport, Florida